Untangling the Nuisance Knot by Halper, Louise A
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 26 | Issue 1 Article 3
9-1-1998
Untangling the Nuisance Knot
Louise A. Halper
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Land Use Planning Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For
more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 89 (1998),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol26/iss1/3
UNTANGLING THE NUISANCE KNOTt 
Louise A. Halper* 
Commentators have long characterized the law of nuisance as a 
muddled and confusing doctrine, limited to deciding a few land use 
disputes not already resolved by zoning. In 1992, interest in the 
doctrine was renewed when the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council declared nuisance the key to the 
difficult question of when legislation amounted to an uncompen-
sated taking of real property. It has thus become important to 
understand both the nuisance doctrine and the confusion sur-
rounding its application. In this article, the author locates the 
source of the confusion in three problems stemming from the 
strict liability standard by which landuse disputes were originally 
governed in the English common law of nuisance. First, the ap-
plication of nuisance doctrine to the landuse disputes inevitably 
accompanying the economic transformation of American society 
from agriculture to industry called for a modification, though not 
an abandonment, of strict liability. Second, bench and bar tangled 
over whether the remnants of strict liability in nuisance could 
moderate some of the negligence doctrines that weighed most 
heavily on tort plaintiffs. Third, attempts by the drafters of the 
Restatement (First and Second) of Torts to rationalize the doc-
trine with a single rule applicable to the law of both accidents and 
landuse disputes failed. Understanding these three forces may 
help both judge and practitioner discover a principled under-
standing of this newly-relevant area of law as they use nuisance 
to assess takings claims under Lucas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The common law of nuisance has a reputation as a messy and dated 
doctrine. Said Justice Blackmun: "one searches in vain ... for any-
thing resembling a principle in the common law of nuisance."! Nor is 
Justice Blackmun alone in his complaint. Nuisance doctrine is notori-
ously contingent and unsummarizable. Generations of legal writers 
expressed their frustration with nuisance doctrine in the most un-
happy terms. As early as 1875, when the first American treatise on 
nuisance was published, its writer Horace Wood already described the 
doctrine as a "'wilderness' of law."2 Warren Seavey, the reporter for 
the nuisance section of the Restatement (First) of Torts,3 called it a 
"mystery."4 William Prosser, the reporter for the Restatement (Sec-
ond), adopted Wood's locational metaphor in calling nuisance law an 
"impenetrable jungle."5 He said it was a "legal garbage can"6 full of 
"vagueness, uncertainty and confusion"7 and told the American Law 
Institute he considered nuisance a "confused and difficult topic."s The 
English legal scholar, F.H. Newark, called it a "mongrel" doctrine, 
"intractable to definition" and "the least satisfactory department" of 
the law of torts.9 More recently, two environmental commentators 
described nuisance, with echoes of Wood and Prosser, as a "quag-
mire,"l0 while Richard Epstein, though saying it is "much-maligned," 
concedes nuisance "does not work on a moral or deductive principle."ll 
1 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1055 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). 
2 HORACE WOOD, THE LAW OF NUISANCES iii (3d ed. 1893). 
3 RESTATEMENT OF 'IbRTS, Introduction, vii (1934). 
4 Warren A. Seavey, Nuisance, Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L. 
REV. 984, 984 (1952). Indeed, Seavey apparently found nuisance law so mysterious that he 
entirely omitted a large part of it-public nuisance-from the First Restatement, to the be-
musement of William Prosser, the reporter for the Second Restatement. In 1969, Prosser, 
perhaps in a dig at Seavey, told the American Law Institute: "[olne of the mysteries of the First 
Restatement of 'furts to me is: What happened to public nuisance, and why isn't it in here?" 46 
A.L.I. PROC. 279 (1970). I also will omit a discussion of public nuisance from this paper, but only 
because it is a topic worthy of its own piece, and will be addressed in a companion article. 
5 William Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REV. 399, 410 (1942) [hereinafter 
Fault]. 
6Id. 
7Id. 
s 46 A.L.I. PROC. 268 (1969). Indeed, resolution of the nuisance section of the Restatement 
(Second) of 'furts seems to have taken longer than any other. See id. at 277-84. 
9 F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REV. 480, 480 (1949). 
10 John E. Bryson & Angus MacBeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of 1brts, 
and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241, 241 (1972). 
11 Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What's Wrong with Euclid?, 5 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.I. 277, 282 (1996). 
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Once the only means of adjusting land use conflicts; nuisance, with 
its confusions, contingencies and lack of principle, had virtually disap-
peared from that role in the first quarter of this century, supplanted 
by tools more suited to large-scale solutions. Zoning is the prototypi-
cal regulatory scheme that replaced the case-limited doctrines of the 
common law. Zoning was followed by a suite of local, state and federal 
regulations enabling city planning, environmental protection, histori-
cal preservation, wilderness conservation, access for the disabled, 
density restrictions, and many other limitations, restrictions, adjust-
ments, prohibitions, and restraints on land use. The troubled history 
of nuisance law should thus have been no more than a footnote in any 
casebook on landuse planning or environmental protection. For many 
years, it was. 
But then, in 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an attempt to bring 
some clarity to the "muddle"12 of takings law, declared that a land-
owner who had lost all the value of her property to uncompensated 
regulation suffered a taking if her legislatively-barred use was one 
the state's common law would not have considered a nuisance.13 Thus, 
nuisance was restored to the agenda of regulators, legislators and 
planners. But, as noted above, the nuisance knot is hardly less con-
fused than the takings muddle. How did it get to be such a mess? 
This article suggests three causes. Judicial attention to the applica-
tion of doctrine within the context of shared social objectives, namely, 
economic growth and development, is one. Another is the attempt of 
lawyers to use the doctrine in ways that are beneficial to their clients, 
regardless of whether the doctrine initially served that purpose. Fi-
nally, and perhaps most damaging to the coherence of the doctrine, 
has been the effort by legal academics and scholars to rationalize the 
doctrine and place it within a large-scale and unified framework. It is 
perhaps the case that any legal doctrine is at various points subject 
to all three of these processes, but few have suffered as much as 
nuisance law. 
It may well be that the history of any common law doctrine can 
be set out within these analytic parameters-the way the doctrine 
changed over years of economic change, the impact of lawyering 
constraints on the doctrine, and the doctrine's SUbjection to the analy-
12 Carol M. Rose, Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984). 
Fourteen years ago, Rose characterized the takings issue as a muddle, writing that while 
commentators proposed "test after test to define 'takings,' ... courts continue[dJ to reach ad hoc 
determinations rather than principled resolutions." Id. at 562. Her characterization has stuck. 
13 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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sis of scholars. Nuisance provides a perfect example of the conse-
quences of all three processes. What is at stake here, however, is more 
important than the creation of an all-purpose model for examining the 
history of common law doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court has told us 
that nuisance-much derided, little studied, hardly used in many 
decades-may hold the key to the takings puzzle. That is why its 
history is worth a new examination today. If we are to look at cases 
decided under the states' common law of nuisance over the years, it 
is worthwhile to have a context within which to place those cases; a 
historical context that may perhaps provide some clues to how that 
newly-important branch ofthe common law is to be understood today. 
This article begins with a brief look at the use of nuisance doctrine 
in the Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council case, in order to 
contextualize the following discussion of nuisance. Part II includes a 
discussion of why nuisance has been resistant to definition. Part III 
addresses judicial attempts to preserve the outlines of a land use 
doctrine based upon strict liability in an age when a negligence stand-
ard encouraged economic development. Part III sets out two modes 
of doctrinal fudging adopted by English and American courts respec-
tively. Part IV focuses on lawyers' attempts to gain the benefit of a 
strict liability doctrine for their injured clients and the response of 
common law courts. Part V examines the largely unsuccessful efforts 
of the drafters of the two Restatements of Torts to deal coherently 
with nuisance. Finally, the article concludes that the confusion about 
nuisance is probably inevitable, given the variety of roles it was called 
upon to play in the common law of property. However, those seeking 
to use common law nuisance cases to determine the constitutional 
dimensions of a regulatory taking should try to understand the dif-
ferent strands of the nuisance knots. This article attempts only to 
explain why nuisance is confused and saves for the future the attempt 
to bring some clarity to the doctrine. 
I. THE LUCAS OPINION 
A. Facts and Holding 
In 1986, David Lucas paid almost $1 million dollars for two non-con-
tiguous oceanfront lots on the Isle of Palms, South Carolina. At the 
time of purchase, both lots were zoned for single-family residential 
construction. Lucas had not yet built on the lots when, two years later, 
the South Carolina legislature directed the state agency responsible 
for coastal zone management, the Coastal Council, to enforce new 
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baselines and setback lines regulating coastal construction. 14 No 
houses could be built seaward of those lines. Lucas's lots were be-
tween the new lines and the sea and Lucas could now construct no 
more than a walkway or small deck.15 
Lucas sued, alleging that the Beachfront Management Act of 1988 
(BMA) constituted a permanent and total taking of the value of his 
property without just compensation. At trial, he prevailed, the court 
finding a permanent, total taking of private property without just 
compensation in contravention of the Fifth Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United Statesl6 and Article I, Section 13 of the South 
Carolina Constitution.17 The Coastal Council appealed. On appeal, the 
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the BMA was in effect a 
nuisance abatement measure, passed to prevent serious public harm; 
thus, Lucas had suffered a noncompensable restriction of his use of 
the property. IS Accordingly, there was no "regulatory taking" entitling 
Lucas to compensation. Lucas appealed this ruling to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, and the Court granted certiorari.19 
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court held that "[ w ]here 
the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economi-
cally beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the 
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate 
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to 
begin with."20 The Court remanded this inquiry to the South Carolina 
Supreme Court to allow the Coastal Council an opportunity to "iden-
tify background principles of nuisance and property law" underlying 
the BMA that might justify barring Lucas from building houses on 
his land.21 The South Carolina Supreme Court then held that no "com-
mon law basis exists by which [the Coastal Council] could restrain 
Lucas's desired use of his land."22 
14 See 1988 Beachfront Management Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10, 48-39-280(C) 
(Supp. 1991). 
15 See id. § 48-39-290. 
16 U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." [d. 
17 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13. "Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, private prop-
erty shall not be taken for private use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use 
without just compensation being first made therefor." [d. 
18 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 901 (S.C. 1991); rev'd, 505 U.S. 
1003 (1992). 
19 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 502 U.S. 966 (1991). 
20 505 U.S. at 1027. 
21 [d. at 1031-32. 
22 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992). It remanded the 
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B. Reasoning and Derivation 
Initially, the Coastal Council had argued that, because the BMA 
was a regulation passed pursuant to the state's police power to pre-
vent harm to the public, David Lucas need not be compensated for 
the loss of his land's value attendant upon enforcement of the new 
building requirements. The Coastal Council contended that there was 
a difference-perhaps not a bright line, but nonetheless discernible-
between the state's exercise of its police power to prevent or abate a 
nuisance, an exercise requiring no compensation for loss of the barred 
use, and the state's taking of property for a desirable public use, which 
required just compensation.23 
Writing for the Lucas majority,24 Justice Scalia rejected the Coastal 
Council's reliance on what had been known as the "nuisance excep-
tion."25 According to Justice Scalia, there is no coherent distinction 
between state action to prevent public harm, which requires no com-
pensation to the owner of the offending use, and state action to secure 
a public benefit by taking private property, requiring compensation 
to a non offending owner.26 What looks like the prevention of harm to 
a member of the public may look like the securing of a benefit to the 
affected landowner-nor is there an easy way to tell who is "right."27 
Rather than attempt to distinguish a public harm from a public 
benefit, Justice Scalia proposed a different inquiry: Is the state pro-
posing to bar an activity or land use that the common law would bar 
case to the trial court for determination of "the actual damages Lucas ... sustained as the result 
of his being temporarily deprived of the use of his property." Id. 
23 See Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899. 
24 The majority opinion written by Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Justices White, O'Connor and Thomas. Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, but rejected 
the reasoning of the majority opinion on the ground that "[tJhe common law of nuisance is too 
narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society." 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035. Justices Blackmun and Stevens each wrote dissenting opinions, and 
Justice Souter filed a statement to the effect that, in his opinion, the writ of certiorari had been 
improvidently granted because the record did not provide an adequate factual basis for the 
conclusion that Lucas had suffered a total deprivation of the value of his land. See id. at 1076. 
25 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). For a discussion of the nuisance exception, 
see Catherine Connors, Back to the Future: The "Nuisance Exception" to the Just Compensa-
tion Clause, 19 CAP. U.L. REV. 139 (1990). 
26 Here Justice Scalia echoes Professor Michelman's influential and ground-breaking critique 
of post-New Deal takings law. Frank 1. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments 
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation Law," 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1197 (1967). 
27 The assumption of those who first offered such an indeterminacy critique was that, if the 
justification for a legislative determination was ambiguous, the appropriate judicial response 
would be deference to the majoritarian judgment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 
117,124 (1891) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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as a nuisance? In clarifying this proposal, Justice Scalia indicated that, 
in his opinion, a court would turn to the state's law of private nuisance 
to learn whether the use could be barred. 
According to Justice Scalia, the takings inquiry will "ordinarily 
entail ... [what] the application of state nuisance law ordinarily en-
tails."28 He tied the application of state nuisance law to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts,29 referring to "the degree of harm ... posed 
by claimant's proposed activities, ... the social value of the claimant's 
activities and their suitability to the locality in question, ... and the 
relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided through 
measures taken by the [parties]."3o Justice Scalia also cited the Re-
statement to the effect that the longevity of a use may be relevant to 
the owner's right to maintain it, as may be the similarity of surround-
ing uses.31 These are all factors proposed in the Restatement as the 
basis for judicial resolution of the disputes of competing landowners.32 
From Justice Scalia's point of view then, the police power, the 
state's power to abate threats to public health and safety, has the 
same outlines as private landowners' ability to enjoin harmful neigh-
boring uses. The state's nuisance abatement power is no greater than 
the ability neighboring landowners have to restrain each other's uses, 
or to get court-ordered damages due to the depredations of a neigh-
boring use. Where private parties can restrain each other's uses, the 
state may do so; where private parties can extinguish each other's 
uses only by purchase, the state too must expend funds. Where a 
landowner could obtain injunctive relief to stop a neighboring land-
owner's use, the state too can halt that use; if the first landowner could 
not enjoin the neighbor'S use, but had to buyout the neighbor to stop 
it, then the state too must compensate in order to end the second use. 
The state is in the same position as the aggrieved private landowner 
and its power to abate public nuisance is "complementary" to the 
power of a landowner to abate private nuisance.33 The implication is 
clear: the individual landowner has no duty to the public different in 
kind from her obligations to neighboring landowners and the state has 
no power to bar that which the common law of private nuisance would 
not allow a neighbor to bar. Thus, non-compensable reductions in 
28 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031. 
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS (1979). 
30 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31. 
31 See id. at 1031. 
32 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §§ 826-831 (1979). 
33 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
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value due to legislative action, at least to the extent of total loss of 
value,34 are valid only pursuant to statutes that codify the common 
law of private nuisance.35 
The law of nuisance is, however, at least contested, and perhaps 
confused beyond repair. Examination of both the doctrine and the 
sources of its confusion is worthwhile to see whether nuisance can in 
fact be helpful in clarifying the takings muddle or whether it further 
confounds it. This article undertakes to untangle some of the elements 
of that confusion and perhaps provide a guide to reading common law 
nuisance cases; however, it leaves for another day the task of suggest-
ing a crisp understanding of the doctrine. 
II. DEFINING NUISANCE 
A large part of the difficulty courts and commentators have with 
nuisance springs from its resistance to a single definition. Although 
nuisance is often called a noninvasive injury to plaintiff's rights to use 
and enjoyment of real property,36 that is a complete definition only of 
private nuisance.37 Neither public nuisance nor the private action on 
a public nuisance are necessarily predicated upon such an injury.38 The 
public nuisance action stems from the injury a private use inflicts on 
public rights, which may occasionally mean harm to real property 
owned by the public, but is more often an injury to common pool 
resources, like silence, clean air or water, or species diversity.39 The 
private action on a public nuisance is based upon a particular and 
unshared injury to plaintiffs property or person, arising from some 
34 There is no answer to the question of why total loss of value triggers a different response 
than near-total loss. See id. at 1019 n.8. 
35 For example, the state can legislate to bar the construction of a nuclear power plant on an 
earthquake fault. See id. at 1029. 
36 See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 683 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1996); Mel Foster Co. Property v. American Oil Co., 427 N.W.2d 171, 173 (Iowa 1988). 
37 Blackstone defined nuisance as "anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience or damage, [or 
anything] done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements or hereditaments of another." 
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216. That definition is often used, but it is over-
broad, for it could include trespass, an invasive injury. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF ToRTS ch. 40, 
Invasions of Interests in the Private Use of Land (Private Nuisance), Scope and Introductory 
Note at 215 (1939). 
38 See generally California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 1998); Friends of Sakonnet v. 
Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623 (D.R.I. 1990); Commonwealth v. Barnes and 'TUcker Co., 319 A.2d 871 
(Pa. 1974). 
39 See Burgess v. MIV Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 249-51 (D. Me. 1973) (granting fishermen the 
right to sue under public nuisance, because of specific damage, but not permitting other busi-
nessmen to so sue); Mayor and Council v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. 1039, 1056-57 
(D.N.J. 1993). 
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use of defendant's property that also amounts to an injury to public 
right.40 
What the three branches of nuisance-private nuisance, public nui-
sance and the private action on a public nuisance-have in common is 
not injury to rights in property, but injury from some use of property. 
This definition was current in the early eighteenth century and re-
peated in the late nineteenth century, though it seems to have gone 
largely unstated in the twentieth century. Thomas Wood, a precursor 
of Blackstone, wrote that one was liable for nuisance who did "any 
thing upon his own ground, to the unlawful hurt or annoyance of his 
neighbor."41 Horace Wood, the author of the first American treatise 
on nuisance, writing in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, said, 
"The idea of a nuisance, generally, is associated with, and more com-
monly arises from the wrongful use of property."42 
Dean Prosser, the great tort rationalizer, saw nuisance as a term 
mistakenly encompassing two entirely different kinds of actions: one 
was private nuisance, the noninvasive interference with private 
rights in land; and public nuisance, an infringement of public rights. 
Both, by an accident of history, came to be called nuisance.43 Prosser 
found that the conflation of public and private nuisance frustrated 
attempts to bring order to what he viewed as a branch of the law of 
tortS.44 Prosser wrote that "[t]he two have nothing in common, ... 
and it is in the highest degree unfortunate that they are called by the 
same name."45 Prosser later modified his story somewhat,46 adopting 
the origins tale of the English legal scholar, F.H. Newark. According 
40 William Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997,1013-14 (1966) 
[hereinafter Private ActionJ. 
41 THOMAS WOOD, AN INSTITUTE ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND (9th ed. 1763) cited in Paul M. 
Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-Entrepreneurial Nuisance Injunctions-Avoiding the Chan-
cellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 642 n.1l0 (1976). 
42 HORACE WOOD, supra note 2, at 20-21. 
43 See Fault, supra note 5, at 411. 
44 See id. 
45Id. According to the most thorough recent version of the history of nuisance, while private 
and public nuisance share both a name and the fact of a landowner's use of her own land to 
interfere with the rights of others, the two had separate creations. See generally Janet Loen-
gard, The Assize of Nuisance: Origins of an Action at Common Law, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144 
(1978). Public nuisance is derived from the criminal action brought to halt and punish depreda-
tions against public right and the king's peace. See id. at 157. Private nuisance arose from the 
assize of nuisance, which barred interference with enjoyment of property. It thus complemented 
the assize of novel disseisin, which put rightful owners in possession of property. See id. at 
158-59. By 1500, plaintiffs were bringing nuisance actions in case rather than relying upon the 
assize. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 482 (2d ed. 1979) 
[hereinafter BAKER IJ. 
46 See Private Action, supra note 40, at 998. 
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to Newark, the original common law action had been the assize of 
nuisance, which lay for interference with rights in the enjoyment of 
land, including interference with private easements like a neighbor's 
right of way.47 By a natural process, interference with a public ease-
ment, like a public right of way over private land, correctly called a 
purpresture, also came to be known as a nuisance; thereafter any 
interference with public rights, whether purpresture or not, was also 
denominated a nuisance. "[T]hus was born the public nuisance, that 
wide term which came to include obstructed highways, lotteries, un-
licensed stage-plays, common-scolds, and a host of other rag ends 
of the law."48 
Unlike Prosser, Newark found the conflation of public and private 
nuisance on the basis of a "superficial resemblance" unproblematic.49 
Private nuisance was the tort of injury to rights in land; public nui-
sance was the crime causing such injury.5O For Newark, it was not the 
assimilation of public and private nuisance that created the problem 
of overbreadth, but the addition of the private action on a public 
nuisance. 51 The fall from grace was the accession of a claim for per-
sonal injuries to nuisance doctrine, effectively removing from nui-
sance the common thread of injury to land. This accession made the 
doctrine susceptible to the kind of broad and overinclusive definition 
suggested by Thomas Cooley, influential judge and treatise author.52 
"[T]he case which set the law of nuisance on the wrong track"53 was 
a 1535 action for blocking a public road so as to hinder plaintiffs access 
to his own property. There Justice Fitzherbert argued that, contra 
the contemporaneous understanding of the law, claims for special or 
particular damage on a public nuisance should be allowed. Fitzherbert 
47 See Newark, supra note 9, at 482. 
48 Jd.; see also J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance-A Critical Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
55 (1989). Spencer attributes the original mistaken confiation of public and private nuisance 
based upon blocking of public and private rights of way to the 13th century legal writer known 
as Bracton. See id. at 58. Since Bracton is generally credited with first using the Latin word 
nocumentum, later translated as "nuisance," as a term of art meaning an interference with 
rights in land, as distinguished from other harms, it is a bit unkind to accuse him of the word's 
misuse. 
49 Newark, supra note 9, at 482. 
50 Prosser, too, came to believe this definition was a way of bringing harmony to nuisance 
doctrine. See 46 A.L.I. PROC. 277 (1970). However, defining public nuisance as always having a 
criminal character was unacceptable to the A.L.I. Committee working on the Restatement 
(Second) and it was not adopted, despite Prosser's efforts. See 47 A.L.I. PROC. 291-304 (1971). 
51 Newark, supra note 9, at 485--88. 
52 THoMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON 'lbRTS 506 (Archibald H. Throckmorton ed., 1930). 
53 Newark, supra note 9, at 483. 
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agreed that blocking the highway was a criminal matter, an indictable 
infringement of the rights of the Crown and public. But he added: 
[W]here one man has greater hurt or inconvenience than any 
other man had, ... then he who has more displeasure or hurt, etc., 
can have an action to recover his damages that he had by reason 
of this special hurt. As if a man make a trench across the highway, 
and I come riding that way by night, and I and my horse together 
fall in the trench so that I have great damage and inconvenience 
in that, I shall have an action against him who made the trench 
across the road because I am more damaged than any other man.54 
Assuming the damage is equally to man and horse, the harm is not 
simply to property, let alone to land, but is in fact a personal injury.55 
The addition of personal injury to the branch of the common law 
which ought only to have dealt with harm to real property reduced 
its doctrinal consistency. Newark claimed the boundaries of nuisance 
were now becoming fogged. 56 Henceforth, only the private nuisance 
was conceptually limited to interference with rights in land. Public 
nuisance was actionable both by criminal indictment for interference 
with public rights and by a private action for the particular damages 
that might be incurred by a plaintiff in respect to the enjoyment of 
those public rights, e.g., an injury due to a fall into the trench across 
the public road.57 
With the addition of personal injury claims to the criminal indict-
ment for interference with public rights and the civil action for inter-
ference with private rights in land, nuisance came to straddle an 
intersection of criminal law, real property law, and tort law. These 
three great categories each had particular forms of liability and nui-
sance came to partake of all of them. Nuisance in its real property 
form was judged by a form of strict liability, which required an end 
to defendant's interference with plaintiff's rights in land, no matter 
64 [d. (quoting Sowthall v. Dagger, Y.B. 27 Hen. fo. 27, pl. 10, cited in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. 
MILSON, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE LAW TO 1750571 n.4 (1986) and 
BAKER I, supra note 45, at 362). 
55 In fact, the action for special damages on a public nuisance due to monetary loss, rather 
than simply personal injury, did not arise for another century and a half. See Private Action, 
supra note 40, at 1013 (citing Hart v. Bassett, 84 Eng. Rep. 1194 (K.B. 1681)). 
66 See Newark, supra note 9, at 482. 
57 See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 493 (3d ed. 1990) [here-
inafter BAKER II]. Subsequently, a public nuisance also became subject to abatement by injunc-
tion, while restitution was available for damage already done. See, e.g., Board of Health v. 
Copcutt, 35 N.E. 443 (N.Y. 1893). Thus, public nuisance came to have a civil side, one that 
sounded in equity. 
100 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:89 
how carefully created or how useful to the community at large.58 
Similarly, an interference with the rights of the public or the sover-
eign could not be allowed to continue on the basis that the interfer-
ence was the product of defendant's due care; the normal standards 
of criminal liability applied to an indictment for public nuisance. 59 The 
liability standard for the personal injury on account of a public nui-
sance, however, was governed by negligence. Obviously, the coher-
ence of a single doctrine governed simultaneously by three liability 
standards was hard to maintain. 
III. NUISANCE LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
This section will discuss the aspect of nuisance historically gov-
erned by strict liability-the doctrine's use as a common law device 
to protect the use and enjoyment of one's land. This section explains 
the ways in which the strict liability standard proved problematic 
in an age of negligence. Originally, strict liability governed any inter-
ference with private rights in the use and enjoyment of property, 
whether that interference was a product of direct invasion, brought 
as an action for trespass, or was the indirect consequence of acts a 
defendant undertook upon her own land, like nuisance, which was 
brought as an action on the case.60 If a neighbor interfered with 
another's use, she must simply cease the interference. Thus, Black-
stone wrote: "[I]f one does any other act, in itself lawful, which yet 
being done in that place necessarily tends to the damage of another's 
property, it is a nusance [sic]: for it is incumbent on him to find some 
other place to do that act, where it will be less offensive."61 
58 BAKER II, supra note 57, at 486-88. 
59 See id. at 492. 
60 Though case later came to be thought of as the appropriate action when the basis of liability 
was negligence, rather than intention, see id. at 481-83, nuisance remained a strict liability 
exception within case, based upon the traditional common law notion that no interference with 
rights in land was tolerable, regardless of the actor's state of mind. For a further discussion of 
the consequences of placing a strict liability label on trespass and a negligence label on case, see 
E.F. Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to ? An Intellectual Escapade in a Tory Vein, 50 
CORNELL L.Q. 191 (1965). 
61 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *217-18. 
1998] THE NUISANCE KNOT 101 
A. Negligence and Strict Liability 
For many years, the common law doctrine of nuisance served as an 
all-purpose tool of landuse regulation, "the common law of competing 
land use."62 While there may be cross-boundary annoyances63 in an 
agrarian economy, where land is wealth, not many land uses conflict. 
Those that do can be subjected to an "act at your peril" rule of strict 
liability,64 without much damage to the economy.65 A rule of strict 
liability in regard to interference with land use was functional at the 
inception of the doctrine and for centuries thereafter, at least insofar 
as it protected established sources of wealth.66 Nuisance was thus not 
a contested doctrine during the period before the Industrial Revolu-
tion.67 
The shift from agriculture to industry meant a vastly wider variety 
of land uses than had existed before; inevitably, the new uses imposed 
and impinged upon the old. When the economy expanded beyond the 
bounds of agriculture, new kinds of active uses, dynamic, voracious 
and large-scale, came to swallow up land and people. Those uses often, 
virtually always, conflicted with the old ones. They involved speed 
and machinery and emissions and smells and discharges and noise and 
steam and the plethora of other "less salubrious consequences" of 
industrial and extractive enterprises.68 
The doctrine of nuisance was readily available for those complaining 
of the new uses. Thus, in shepherding the transition from a small-scale 
agrarian and mercantile economy to a great industrial and commercial 
one, nuisance in effect became a battleground between competing 
62Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 
403,406 (1974). 
63 See, e.g., William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611) (rendering judgment against 
neighbor maintaining a pig sty next to plaintiffs house); Jones v. Powell, 123 Eng. Rep. 1155 
(K.B. 1629) (stating neighbor has action for nuisance from brewery smoke). 
64 The classic statement of such liability is from Hull v. Orynge, The Case of Thorns, Y.B. 6 
Edw. IV, fo. 7, pI. 18 (1466): "[WJhen someone does something he is bound to do it in such a way 
that no prejudice or damages are done to others by his action .... If a man suffers damage it 
is right that he should be compensated." 
65 But see David Abraham, Liberty and Property: Lord Bramwell and the Political Economy 
of Liberal Jurisprudence, Individualism, Freedom and Utility, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 288, 292 
(1994) (stating that strict liability "certainly functioned as a drag on commerce"). 
66 See id. 
67 See Brenner, supra note 62, at 406-07. 
6BJohn P.S. McLaren, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution: Some Lessons from 
Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 155, 161 (1983). 
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land uses. As John McLaren has put it, nuisance law historically 
mediated "the clash of two very basic interests in landuse disputes-
the interest in conserving the land and preserving time-honored 
uses on the one hand, and the interest in productive exploitation of 
the land and its resources on the other."69 
For those whose new and intensive uses were challenged, the strict 
liability standard of nuisance was anathema, for it meant that the 
injuries done by a new use must be internalized as part of its cost, 
thereby diminishing its profits. Thus, negligence was the favored 
"doctrine of an emerging entrepreneurial class that argued that there 
should be no liability for socially desirable activity that caused injury 
without carelessness"7o and strict liability was seen as a burden.71 
Certainly a negligence standard for injury to rights in land would 
have been useful as a subsidy to active uses, uses that inevitably cause 
some harm, but that are crucial to economic development. A straight-
forward rule that any use that interferes with a neighbor's rights in 
land must be abated increases the costs of investment in offending 
uses, causing a decline in profits, and thus slowing growth and expan-
sion. It would seem inevitable that the liability rule in nuisance would 
become one of negligence, replacing the older doctrine of strict liabil-
ity. As David Abraham points out, everywhere "erosion of European 
medieval conceptions of full or strict liability only weakly hinged to 
fault was closely connected to the rise of capitalist entrepreneurship 
and bourgeois conceptions of individual human agency."72 
Of course, there already existed a model for negligence liability in 
service of the American economy. Claims for damages on account of 
personal injury were judged by a negligence standard, a standard that 
explicitly subsidized industrial development and economic growth.73 
69Id. 
70 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 124 (1992) 
[hereinafter TRANSFORMATION II]; see also Abraham, supra note 65, at 291 ("Any excessive 
burdening of entrepreneurs with liability not manifestly theirs [Le., strict liability] was both a 
drag on [commercial] initiative and an invitation to negligence on the part of others."). 
71 In the 19th century, as David Abraham points out, "D]iberal hostility toward landed prop-
erty and hidebound privilege was deep. Agrarian protectionism in the broadest sense-from 
strict liability through statist conceptions of property . . . came under sharp liberal attack." 
Abraham, supra note 65, at 316. 
72 Id. at 292. 
73 See, e.g., Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 450 (1873) (According to Judge Doe, strict liability 
rules "were certainly introduced in England at an immature stage of English jurisprudence, and 
an undeveloped stage of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, when the nation had not 
settled down to those modern, progressive, industrial pursuits which the spirit of the common 
law, adapted to all conditions of society, encourages and defends."); Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 
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Whether an "act at your peril" rule had ever existed with respect to 
personal injuries is a fraught question,14 but there is no disagreement 
that by the time of the Civil War, negligence was indeed the rule in 
personal injury, with Brown v. KendaW5 being the case Holmes chose 
to illustrate the principle in The Common Law.76 Yet a negligence 
rule-harm due to the careful operation of a socially-useful undertak-
ing is incompensable-was not formally extended to the injuries to 
real property that could be the product of the very same undertaking, 
operated in precisely the same manner.77 Where a nuisance did harm 
to a neighbor's rights in land, due care provided no protection from 
liability for compensation. As Morton Horwitz says, "While other 
areas of the law were changing to accommodate the growth of Ameri-
can industry, the law of nuisances for the longest time appeared on 
its face to maintain the pristine purity of a preindustrial mentality."78 
The negligence standard that was at the heart of tort law in the 
late nineteenth century based compensation on a judgment about 
defendant's conduct rather than plaintiff's injury. The reasons why 
nuisance continued to be governed by strict liability presents an 
interesting problem. 
It may be that across-the-board application of the personal injury 
due care standard to property harms would simply have changed 
property rights too significantly. While complete immunity for indus-
try's injurious activity would have stabilized tort law with a single 
liability standard for harm to both land and person, it also would have 
destabilized property law by creating two levels of rights in land. 
476,484-85 (1873) ("We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads ... if I have 
any of these upon my lands, and are not a nuisance, and are not so managed as to become such, 
I am not responsible for any damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor. He 
receives his compensation for such damage by the general good, in which he shares, and the 
right which he has to place the same things on his lands."). 
74 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-186089-94 
(1977) [hereinafter TRANSFORMATION IJ (stating that there was once an "act at your peril" rule 
in the law of torts). But see Gary T. Schwartz, Thrt Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Cen-
tury America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.I. 1717, 1727--34 (1981) (maintaining that no "act 
at your peril" rule existed). 
75 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850). Horwitz argues the principle of negligence had already been 
widely adopted by the time of Brown v. Kendall, and that the case's preeminence in our historical 
accounts is in fact a consequence of its adoption by Holmes as the ur-text, rather than its own 
transformative power. See TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 74, at 90. 
76 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 105-06 (1881). 
77 See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Tort Principle: A Reinterpretation, 
15 GA. L. REV. 925, 946 (1981) (stating that "[oJnly slowly, over a period extending well beyond 
the supposed halcyon days of negligence, were ... property-dominated principles subordinated 
to the tort system."). 
78 TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 74, at 74. 
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While a negligence standard would have encouraged economic devel-
opment, it also would have amounted to a declaration that some kinds 
of land use allowed owners special rights to do injury to the more 
passive uses of their neighbors. Not only was such a broad declaration 
unsupported by the common law, but such a declaration threatened 
the fundamental liberal principle that rights in property are not de-
pendent upon the quantum of property owned. Such rights are not 
quantitative but qualitative.79 
Although strict liability was economically costly, and hence a bur-
den to a growing class of investors in active uses and to the expanding 
capitalist economy it represented, it was nonetheless in some sense 
profoundly liberal, profoundly necessary to a market economy. Strict 
liability for interference with uses of real property rested on the 
principle that property rights are qualitatively equal, that is, that no 
property owner has greater rights than another by virtue of birth, 
position or the amount of property owned. As J.E. Penner put it, 
"What distinguishes ... property right[s] is not just that they are 
only contingently ours, but that they might just as well be someone 
else's . ... [T]here is nothing special about my ownership of a particu-
lar car-the relationship the next owner will have is essentially iden-
tical."BO 
The notion that rights in real property, indeed in any sort of prop-
erty, are qualitatively identical among property owners regardless of 
the owner's birth, character, wealth, creed or ideology, was a powerful 
79 See, e.g., Woodruffv. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. Supp. 753, 807 (C.C.D. Cal. 
1884) ("If the smaller interest must yield to the larger, all small property rights, and all smaller 
and less important enterprises, industries, and pursuits would sooner or later be absorbed by 
the large, more powerful few."); Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 58 N.E. 142, 145 (N.Y. 1900) (stating 
that allowing large-scale uses to impose burdens on their neighbors without compensation 
''would amount to a virtual confiscation of the property of small owners in the interest of a strong 
combination of capital"); McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951, 952 (1904) (cited 
in Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 49, 74 n.64 (1979) ("[Defendant contends] that it is engaged in a business of such 
extent and involving such a large capital that the value of the plaintiffs' rights ... is relatively 
small, and that therefore an injunction ... would inflict a much greater injury on [defendant] 
than it would confer benefit upon the plaintiffs .... If correct the property of the poor is held 
by uncertain tenure .... [I]t would be declared that private property is held on the condition 
that it may be taken by any person who can make a more profitable use of it, provided that such 
person shall be answerable in damage to the former owner to his injury."»; Whalen v. Union 
Paper Bag Co., 101 N.E. 805, 806 (N.Y. 1913) (holding that distinctions based on the scale of 
ownership of the contending parties are improper: "Neither courts of equity nor law can be 
guided by such a rule, for if followed to its logical conclusion it would deprive the poor litigant 
of his little property by giving it to those already rich."). 
8OJ.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 112 (1997) (emphasis in original). 
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tool in freeing the economy from the bonds of what liberals considered 
an outdated feudal mentality.S! That principle was egalitarian, at least 
in respect to those who owned property, and it was opposed to aris-
tocratic privilege.82 Not only is the notion normatively appealing from 
an equality standpoint, but it is indispensable ifland is to be treated as 
a commodity that can be freely exchanged.8a It gives effect to the rule 
that all must be free to participate in the market, and to deal with 
each other without ascriptive or prescriptive barriers. The equality 
of property owners and the absolute nature of their property rights 
fundamentally separates liberal accounts of property from feudal 
ones.84 
Affording large-scale uses a privilege to injure small-scale uses 
would divide property into two categories, the useful and the less 
useful, and entitlements and disabilities would attach in greater or 
lesser degree depending upon the category. Such a split amongst 
property owners could, in a democracy, imperil the sanctity of prop-
erty rights and endanger the always uneasy stasis within which prop-
erty and democracy coexisted.85 The utilitarian distinction, recogniz-
ing entitlements based on the difference in wealth of owners, could 
have redistributive consequences, consequences the law would be too 
compromised to prevent. As Richard Epstein warns, "The fundamen-
tal weakness of the pure utilitarian point of view is that it fails to 
explicitly recognize any antecedent or natural rights that the legal 
system is called upon not to create but to recognize and protect."86 A 
utilitarian approach to property rights provides no protection against 
any course a majority may choose as being useful. The maintenance 
of a coherent private property regime within a majoritarian context 
requires at least formal egalitarianism amongst property owners as a 
guarantee of the continued existence of property rights. A single rule 
81 See IAN SHAPIRO, THE EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY 53 passim (1986). 
82 For a discussion of the ideology of property rights and its political contest with the ideology 
of aristocratic privilege, see H.T. DICKINSON, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1977). 
83 See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944), especially chapter six, The 
Self-Regulating Market and the Fictitious Commodities: Labor, Land and Money. 
84 For a discussion of the liberal attack on "feudal" forms of ownership, see Robert Gordon, 
Paradoxical Property, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 95, 106-08 (John 
Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995). 
B5 As Horwitz put it, avoiding redistribution, "coerced economic equality," has consistently 
been "[tlhe fundamental issue of American political thought ... [inl this most politically demo-
cratic country in the world." TRANSFORMATION II, supra note 70, at 9. 
86 Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 79, at 74. 
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must thus govern the consequences of harm to a neighbor's property 
done by another property use, a rule inaccessible to considerations of 
the relative utility of the neighbors' uses. 
The difficulty remains, however. An "act at your peril" rule renders 
investment in active ventures substantially riskier than they would 
be with a negligence rule. As Epstein, no fan of utilitarianism, points 
out correctly in this context, "Whatever the weakness of utilitarian-
ism as a comprehensive moral philosophy, it takes heroic assumptions 
(fiat justicia, ruat coelum [let justice be done, though the heavens 
fall]) to always treat all its consequences as irrelevant."87 Thus, Ep-
stein argues for a certain amenability of natural rights theory to 
utilitarianism around the edges, at least when economic development 
is at stake.88 Common law courts faced with the nuisance suits of 
"smallholders" -the owners of smaller tracts-against large ones 
adopted this outcome. 
Smallholders negatively affected by neighboring large-scale uses 
sought to enjoin the active uses that disturbed them, citing the Black-
stonian wisdom of the common law that an offending use must cease, 
regardless of its utility. However, economic development was discour-
aged when fledgling industry was burdened with internalization of 
those externalities that were the product of careful operation. Courts 
faced with this dilemma finessed it: without formally abandoning the 
strict liability standard of nuisance, and the underlying principle of 
egalitarian property rights, they modified how the standard was ap-
plied in practice, and allowed developmental uses to continue. '!\vo 
approaches were developed, one more popular in England, the other, 
in the United States, though both were in fact used in each country. 
B. The English Rule: The Existence of a Nuisance Is Place-and 
Time-Dependent 
In England, courts faced with the problem of halting development 
on account of uses that interfered with neighbors generally refused 
to undertake a balancing of the social utility of active versus passive 
uses or large versus small uses.89 In the well-known case, Attorney 
General v. Council of the Borough of Birmingham,90 a farmer plaintiff 
87 [d. at 75. 
88 [d. at 82, 88. 
89 SeeJ.E. Penner, Nuisance and the Character of the Neighborhood, 5J. ENVTL. L.1, 2 (1993) 
(In England, "the greater good of the public has almost never been regarded as a factor 
rendering nonactionable what would otherwise be a nuisance."). 
90 70 Eng. Rep. 220 (Ch. 1858). Said the equity judge hearing the application for injunction, 
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sought to enjoin city drainage operations that prevented the watering 
of downstream cattle. The city as defendant argued that granting 
plaintiff the injunction he sought would cause illness and disease 
amongst its 250,000 inhabitants. But the court said it was "a matter 
of almost absolute indifference" how many people would be affected 
by its refusal to allow injury to plaintiff's rights.91 "If, after all possible 
experiments, they cannot drain Birmingham without invading Plain-
tiff's private rights, they must apply to Parliament."92 The court would 
offer no remedy that relied upon balancing the plaintiff's rights 
against the social utility of their violation. 
In actual practice, however, the Birmingham case was exceptional. 
Courts that refused to balance nonetheless avoided enjoining active 
uses by defining very narrowly both plaintiffs' rights and what 
amounted to a nuisance. In particular, English courts adopted the 
notion of rights varying on the basis of location and on community 
standards. This notion served as a means of incorporating decisions 
about what uses served the public good. The English legal scholar, 
J.E. Penner wrote, "An assessment of the greater public good [was 
required] as an integral part of assessing the effect of the neighbour-
hood character rule in nuisance."93 Under that rule, what might be a 
nuisance in a rural agricultural area was no nuisance in a town or 
industrial area.94 A plaintiff simply could not expect to obtain the same 
conditions of life in one place as in the other. "What could be a nuisance 
in Belgrave Square [an upper-class London neighborhood] would not 
necessarily be so in Bermondsey [a working-class neighborhood]."95 
Where a use was located, rather than what the use was, might deter-
mine whether it was a nuisance. Space was differentiated on the basis 
of the character of the activities that took place; one had differing 
expectations of ownership depending upon where one was located. 
"I am not sitting here as a committee for the public safety, armed with arbitrary power to 
prevent what, it is said, will be a great injury not only to Birmingham but to the whole of 
England." Id. at 225. 
91Id. 
92 Id. at 226. 
93 Penner, supra note 89, at 2. 
94 The first reported case of this type was Hole v. Barlow, 140 Eng. Rep. 1113 (C.P. 1858), an 
action against a brickmaker, in which the jury was advised ''that in deciding whether the 
defendant had caused a nuisance it was legitimate to ask whether he had established his 
operation in a convenient and proper place." McLaren, supra note 68, at 174. The case went 
against plaintiff. The holding in the case was subsequently rejected in Bamford v. '!Urley, 122 
E.R. 27 (1862), but its rationale was adopted by Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch.n. 852 (1879). 
However, Brenner, supra note 62, at 412-13, suggests that the notion of community standards 
''had been long operating" even before Hole v. Barlow. 
95 Sturges, 11 Ch.n. at 865 (emphasis in original). 
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Thus, English courts, faced with the need to maintain the vitality 
of the common law in the face of economic expansion, relied upon a 
very narrow definition of nuisance to restrict the harm small-scale 
plaintiffs could do to large-scale defendants,96 while they rejected any 
attempt to balance the relative utility of plaintiff's and defendant's 
uses. "The rhetoric forbidding balancing of equities in determining 
injunctive relief remained firm, while the grounds for claiming nui-
sance slipped away."97 
While the notion of community-based ownership expectations de-
veloped in England, judges in the United States adopted it as well. 
Justice Sutherland famously said that a "nuisance may be merely a 
right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the 
barnyard."98 Holmes also based the existence of nuisance liability on 
community standards. The resemblance to the English rule lies in 
Holmes' notion of how fault was determined in nuisance, given its 
strict liability character. The blameworthiness Holmes found in nui-
sance was not a state of mind determined by examining the individual 
conscience, but rather the fault attributable to one who violates the 
norms of the community, regardless of her state of mind.99 Later, 
community standards as a yardstick for jUdging the severity of plain-
tiff's injury became a guidepost for the Restatements as well. lOo 
96 See, e.g., Penner, supra note 89, at 5 (citing Walter v. Selfe, 4 DeG & SM 315, 322 (1851)) 
(stating that a nuisance must affect the right to "the ordinary comfort physically of human 
existence, not merely according to elegant or dainty modes and habits of living but according 
to plain, sober and simple notions among English people."). 
97 D.M. Provine, Balancing Pollution and Property Rights: A Comparison of the Develop-
ment of English and American Nuisance Law, 7 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 31, 43 (1978). 
98 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
99 Indeed, this objective standard applied to both the plaintiff and the defendant. A nuisance 
plaintiffs injuries, unlike those of the tort plaintiff, were judged actionable or not depending 
upon the standards of the community, rather than the individual character or predilections of 
the plaintiff. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
100 See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text. 
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C. The American Rule: A Nuisance Will Not Always Be Enjoined 
1. Legislative Authorization and the Balancing of Equities 
The approach initially adopted in this country was straightfor-
wardly utilitarian: balancing the equities, that is, weighing harm to 
plaintiff against the social utility of defendant's use. From the incep-
tion of their jurisdiction over applications for injunctive relief against 
activities claimed to be nuisances,lOl American courts of equity took 
into account the social utility of those activities in the decision as to 
whether a nuisance existed, something which the common law of 
nuisance did not on its face allow. 102 The rationale was that because 
the granting of injunctive relief was always a matter for the discretion 
of the court, rather than a matter of right, courts could balance the 
equities. This judicial practice found justification in the doctrine of 
legislative authorization. Because legislatures granted the privilege 
of corporate status on a case-by-case basis, resting upon a public 
interest in the corporation's aims, a corporate use was of necessity not 
simply private; even if privately owned, it was in the public interest.103 
101 Nuisances were not subject to injunction until the early 18th century; the first reported 
English case granting injunctive relief is Bush v. Western, 24 Eng. Rep. 237 (1720) (cited in 
Brenner, supra note 62, at 406 n.ll). McLaren, supra note 68, at 186, says such injunctions were 
not "regularly" granted in England until the end of the century. They were awarded where 
damages did not provide adequate compensation or where the interference was continuous or 
recurring. See id. Paul Kurtz suggests that nuisance injunctions were not available in America 
until somewhat later. See Kurtz, supra note 41, at 625 n.24, 628. 
102 See Kurtz, supra note 41, at 632-33. In England, a statute of 1852 gave equity courts the 
power to decide legal matters before them. See Provine, supra note 97, at 34 n.5. In the United 
States, equity courts considered rights in real property matters of law and routinely refused to 
hear cases raising real property issues until about the same time as the English statute. See 
Kurtz, supra note 41, at 628. In fact, some states found it necessary to write legislation which 
gave courts at law and courts in equity equal abilities to deal with nuisance cases. See, e.g., Act 
of 1901, c. 139 Tenn. Code Ann. § 3403 (1901) (cited in Madison v. Duckworth Sulphur, Copper 
& Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 666 (1904». Through the Act, an amendment to the Tennessee Code of 
1858, "the two courts (law and equity) were put upon a substantial parity in dealing with 
nuisances, in respect of the granting of final relief in such cases." Madison, 83 S.W. at 666. In 
Madison, plaintiff-farmers, injured by a mineral extraction operation, were denied injunctive 
relief against a nuisance and required to accept damages because the industrial operation was 
a major employer and taxpayer in the region. [d. 
103 Initially, incorporation by special charter by the legislature was only permitted for busi-
nesses which were involved in a "public utility." JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF 
THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 17 (1970). John 
Marshall explained the underlying principle of special charters in Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. 518, 537-38 (1819): "The objects for which a corporation is created are universally 
such as the government wishes to promote. They are deemed beneficial to the country; and this 
110 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:89 
The legislature had authorized the use, and that authorization was 
relevant to the question of whether a use should be halted. 
The doctrine of authorization permitted a case-by-case, rather than 
wholesale, introduction of negligence liability into nuisance, hereto-
fore governed by a strict liability standard. Legislatures, who were 
conceptually the authors of incorporation, a privilege granted on the 
basis of public utility, were understood to have also granted individ-
ual uses the privilege of a negligence standard when the charter 
of incorporation was issued.104 Courts concluded that such chartered 
enterprises were legislatively authorized to condemn surrounding 
uses to sustain the harms imposed upon them by their useful 
and careful neighbors.105 Canals, railroads, reservoirs, gas works, new 
streets, refuse collection, steam boilers, sewer systems, subways, 
power plants, dams, telegraph lines, and a myriad of other active uses 
were designated as public utilities.106 Though undertaken for private 
profit, they were imbued with the public interest, and for the public 
good, legislatures could both benefit and regulate them. Among the 
benefits accorded was the right to cause unrecoverable and indirect 
injuries to the property of their neighbors, so long as the injuries were 
a consequence of activities carried out with due care.107 
Hence, if harm occurred in consequence of careful operation of the 
chartered use, courts presumed, unless plaintiff provided proof to the 
contrary, the grant of the corporate charter implicitly authorized such 
unavoidable harm. The charter was taken to operate as a legislative 
decision that the social benefit of the use outweighed private harm 
resulting from careful operation. lOS Consequently, in derogation of the 
benefit constitutes the consideration, and, in most cases, the sole consideration of the grant [of 
incorporation]." The requirement of public utility for the granting of a corporate charter con-
tinued long into the 19th century. See HURST, supra, at 17. 
104 See Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New York Court of Appeals, 
1850-1915,54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 309-19 (1990). 
105 Horwitz attributes the construction ofthe doctrine that legislative authorization conferred 
immunity from strict liability to the treatise writer Theodore Sedgwick who, he says, "con-
structed [it] out of a handful of prior English and American cases." TRANSFORMATION I, supra 
note 71, at 79. It is worth noting, however, that English courts generally rejected the legislative 
authorization defense. See Provine, supra note 97, at 35 (citing Attorney Gen. v. Committee of 
Visitors of the Lunatic Asylum at Colney Hatch, 38 L.J. Ch. 265 (1869)). 
106 See HURST, supra note 103, at 17-18. 
107 See, e.g., RadcJiffs Executors v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 195, 200 (1850) (holding that 
"an act done under lawful authority, if done in a proper manner, can never subject the party to 
an action, whatever consequences may follow." (emphasis in original)); Bellinger v. New York 
Cent. R.R., 23 N.Y. 42, 47 (1861) (holding that where one has ''the sanction of the State for what 
he does, ... unless he commits a fault in the manner of doing it, he is completely justified."). 
108 See, e.g., Radcliff's Executors, 4 N.Y. at 195 (asserting that the state could authorize 
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common law, courts recognized a negligence standard of liability for 
uses under legislative authorization. Courts did not view the grant of 
a negligence standard as a taking of plaintiff's property, because no 
property was in fact taken-the rule at the time requiring compensa-
tion only in case of confiscation.109 Courts agreed that by granting a 
corporate charter, thus deciding that a particular use provided a 
benefit to the public, the legislature gave that use the privilege to 
harm a neighbor's property carefully without liability to compensate 
the neighbor. l1O A prodevelopmental policy that "private interests 
must yield to the public welfare"111 justified legislative imposition 
upon neighbors of a duty to bear nonnegligent harms sans particular 
compensation. The injured party found his compensation in the gen-
eral outcome of economic progress.l12 Only if the authorized use oper-
ated negligently would injury to a neighbor be compensable.ll3 
socially useful activities even if the activities would have been considered a nuisance in any 
other context, so long as the activities were not carried out negligently). The defendant in 
Radcliffwas a city that, through digging up streets to carry out infrastructural improvements, 
had deprived the plaintiff's land of subsurface support. Id. at 196-97. 
109 See, e.g., Bellinger, 23 N.Y. at 48 (holding that legislative authorization will not extend to 
takings without compensation, but consequential damages on account of an authorized use are 
not a taking); People v. Kerr, 27 N.Y. 188 (1863) (holding a railroad could appropriate city streets 
without compensating abutters). 
110 See TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 74, at 78-79 (citing Spring v. Russell, 7 Green!. 273, 
289-90 (Me. 1831); Kerr, 27 N.Y. at 190; and Bellinger, 23 N.Y. at 42, in support of this view. 
But citing contra Ten Eyck v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 3 Harr. 200 (N.J. 1841) and Hooker 
v. New-Haven & Northampton Co., 14 Conn. 146 (1841». 
111 Cogswell v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 8 N.E. 537, 541 (N.Y. 1886). 
112 See, e.g., Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 485 (1873) (stating that when useful activities 
cause unavoidable injury to a neighbor, "[h]e receives his compensation for such damage by the 
general good, in which he shares, and the right which he has to place the same things upon his 
lands."); Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 577 (1876) (stating that "[p]ersons living in organized 
communities must suffer some damage, annoyance and inconvenience from each other. For these 
they are compensated by all the advantages of civilized society."). 
The language used by courts in roughly contemporaneous English cases was remarkably 
similar. See, e.g., Bamford v. 'lUrnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 25, 32 (1862) (Pollock, C.B.) (''The compro-
mises that belong to social life, and upon which the peace and comfort of it mainly depend, 
furnish an indefinite number of examples where some apparent natural right is invaded, or some 
enjoyment abridged to provide for the more general convenience or necessities of the whole 
community .... "). 
113 The use oflegislative authorization as a defense against a nuisance action never completely 
died out. As late as the 1960s, courts held that statutes providing benefits to particular indus-
tries also had the effect of immunizing those industries from the suits of private plaintiffs 
complaining of the effects of the industries' nonnegligent activities. See, e.g., Gerring v. Gerber, 
219 N.Y.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (upholding the proposition that commercial zoning protects 
industry from nuisance suit). There is also a series of similar decisions from Florida. See, e.g., 
National Container Corp. v. State ex rel. Stockton, 189 So. 4 (Fla. 1939) (holding that the tax 
exemption offered to attract industry serves as legislative decision of utility of industry); 
Watson v. Holland, 20 So.2d 388, 394 (Fla. 1944) (determining that an oil lease statute protects 
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Even this relatively limited form of statutory authorization as the 
basis of exemption from strict liability threatened the classical unitary 
conception of property rights referenced in this article.lI4 It could oust 
the common law and the judiciary from their role in protecting rights 
in land, rendering landuse controversies a question for the legislature. 
Allowing the legislature to decide landuse controversies would make 
that area wholly political, with all the attendant uncertainty about the 
maintenance of rights which the political arena implies. Aside from 
such apocalyptic possibilities, another practical reason to reject legis-
lative authorization existed. Over time, the privilege to do harm care-
fully could lock in an old use and, through the grant of the subsidy of 
a negligence standard, prevent its replacement by a more profitable 
one. In other words, the cure might prove as bad as the disease.lI5 
Courts came to describe legislative authorization as conditional and 
limited,lI6 and the courts undertook to playa more active role in the 
nuisance inquiry. They mandated fact-specific investigations into the 
precise nature of the claimed authorization, the utility of the defen-
dant's use, authorized or not, the character of the area in which it took 
place, and the benefits plaintiff could be said to derive, in common 
with others, from the use.ll7 In effect, courts rejected the legislature 
as the appropriate institution to separate property into that which 
could do harm carefully and that which could not. They did not, 
however, forego making those distinctions themselves. 
2. Replacing Nuisance Injunctions with Damages 
Courts judicialized the project of distinguishing among uses by 
modifying the remedies available to nuisance plaintiffs. Where pre-
viously the Blackstonian doctrine mandated that when a nuisance 
could be proved, a plaintiff was entitled to its abatement, courts of 
coastal drilling from nuisance suits); Brooks v. Patterson, 31 So.2d 472 (Fla. 1947) (deciding that 
an airport licensed by a municipality is not a nuisance). 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 81-88. 
116 See, e.g., Cogswell, 8 N.E. at 537 (noting that the legislative grant on which defendant 
relied, and which court rejected as not authorizing the specific injury sustained by plaintiff, was 
almost fifty years old). 
116 See, e.g., Bohan v. Port Jervis Gas-Light Co., 25 N.E. 246 (N.Y. 1890) (holding that 
legislative authorization does not amount to grant of power of condemnation). 
117 See, e.g., Booth v. Rome, W. & O.T.R. Co., 35 N.E. 592, 594-95 (N.Y. 1893) (holding that a 
use is not a nuisance if it is "a reasonable exercise of the right of property, having regard to 
time, place and circumstances, ... having regard to all interests affected, [the owner's] and those 
of his neighbors, and having in view also public policy."). A determined court could make any 
use a nuisance or no nuisance within such a test. 
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equity were willing to couple the finding of nuisance with a remedy 
limited to damages. us Thus, small-scale plaintiffs could have damages 
by way of compensation for their injuries, but they were denied the 
power to halt large-scale uses.U9 Strict liability remained the hallmark 
of nuisance, but the equitable remedy was submerged in favor of 
damages awarded by a court of equity.120 
The damages remedy did not formally replace injunctive relief. 
Mandatory damages without the possibility of injunctive relief vio-
lated the coherence of the law of property, which could not formally 
encompass the notion that a diminution in one owner's rights in land 
at the hands of another landowner could be suffered to continue 
indefinitely. Judges did not often say that the relief they offered was 
dependent upon the extent of plaintiff's property rather than plain-
tiff's injury. Indeed, some courts continued to claim that injunctions 
were warranted whenever a plaintiff was injured, regardless of the 
comparative weight of defendant's use and the care taken in conduct-
ing it. These courts repeated the traditional doctrinal formula: 
"[n]uisance does not rest upon the degree of care used, for that 
presents a question of negligence, but on the degree of danger exist-
ing even with the best of care."121 Into the twentieth century, legal 
academic literature denied the existence of the damage/no injunction 
remedy courts continued to offer, claiming that courts' only alterna-
tives were the nuisance/no nuisance finding regardless of the balance 
of equities.l22 Nonetheless, in practice, courts continued to offer, in-
118 See, e.g., Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904). 
119 See, e.g., Cogswell, 8 N.E. at 537. 
120 See, e.g., Westphal v. City of New York, 69 N.E. 369, 370 (N.Y. 1904) (plaintiff seeking 
injunction had submitted to jurisdiction of equity court and could not contest its damages award, 
nor demand a jury trial on the issue of damages). 
121 Melker v. City of New York, 83 N.E. 565, 568 (N.Y. 1908). 
122 See, e.g., Note, Equitable Relief Against Nuisances, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 635, 637 (1913) 
(awarding permanent damages and no injunction for a nuisance "is not consonant with the 
common law methods of protecting property."); Note, The "Balance of Injury" as a Reasonfor 
Refusing an Injunction to Restrain a Nuisance, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 396, 398 (1909) (stating that 
"[tlhe weight of authority seems to be that the injury to the defendant or the public cannot be 
considered."). 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. was a case which in effect awarded damages upon a finding 
of nuisance, but denied injunctive relief. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). When first decided, Boomer 
was both hailed and attacked as a departure from the norm. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, 
Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damages Remedies, 
32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1079 n.10 (1980) (citing Boomer as an example of the current "increasing 
judicial preference" for damage remedies in landuse disputes); Robert Rabin, Nuisance Law: 
Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1334 n.98 (1977) (placing Boomer 
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deed to insist upon,123 damage awards to plaintiffs who rightly com-
plained of injury to the use and enjoyment of their property. 
An example of this dual policy of announcing the equality of all 
forms of property while in fact refusing to implement the conse-
quences of such equality is the well-known case of Whalen v. Union 
Bag & Paper Company.124 Whalen was the standard cite for the 
so-called "New York rule" that an injunction would not be denied on 
the basis of the relative utilities of plaintiff's and defendant's uses.125 
In fact, though the Whalen court did, in ringing terms, grant plaintiff 
farmer an injunction against the defendant factory's continuation of 
its water pollution,126 the injunction was actually conditional. It was 
to take effect a year later, and only if defendant refused to pay 
court-assessed permanent damages.127 In reality, the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals in that case overturned the Appellate Division's 
grant of an immediate injunction, instead reinstating the trial court's 
conditional injunction, a remedy which amounted to a damage 
award. 128 
In short, when quarrels between neighboring landowners had con-
sequences for development, a satisfactory judicial resolution under 
the common law might be one that retained the formal outlines of the 
common law, but contained a very different substance within. The 
Whalen injunction is the perfect example of damages in the guise of 
equitable relief. Obviously, such a deviation between form and sub-
stance substantially contributed to the confusion about just what the 
law of nuisance was. And we must add to this confusion of remedies 
the adoption of the English rule which made the same use a nuisance 
in some situations and not in others. The essentially political require-
ment for maintenance of a strict liability standard for injuries to 
property had created the concomitant need for judicial flexibility to 
bend that rule in the interests of continuing growth. The judiciary 
responded to this need, but the coherence of the nuisance doctrine 
suffered in the process. 
among the earliest cases in which a significant trend to damage awards began to appear); 
Provine, supra note 97, at 45 (calling Boomer a "strict anti-balancing" case). 
123 See, e.g., Westphal, 69 N.E. at 369. 
124 101 N.E. 805 (N.Y. 1913). 
126 See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 872. 
128 101 N.E. at 806. 
127 See id. at 805, 806. 
128 See id. 
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IV. NUISANCE: ToRT AND REGULATION 
A. The Bureaucratization of Land Use Decisions 
Eventually, the role of nuisance in resolving land use conflicts be-
came less important as the rise of zoning bureaucratized land use 
issues. The key event which gave the stamp of approval to a process 
begun at the turn of the century was the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company.129 In Euclid, the Court 
held that public authorities could in fact make aggregated nuisance-
like decisions on a large scale without triggering a requirement of just 
compensation. Land use decisions no longer needed to be made on a 
case-by-case basis, either by courts using the common law or by 
legislative authorization of a particular developmental enterprise 
with the concomitant privilege to do harm carefully. Rather, a profes-
sional bureaucracy, directed by some political input, would make 
wholesale decisions as to appropriate land use in cities, towns, sub-
urbs and exurbs. Those decisions, which affected all the residents of 
an area, created what Justice Holmes called a "reciprocity of advan-
tage"l30 for all who lived, worked and invested within a regime of 
rationalized land use planning. No inquiry was required into whether 
one owner or another deserved compensation, and the equitable rem-
edy of injunction was rarely, if ever, appropriate.131 
Once zoning began the wholesale rationalization of land use, public 
authorities had only very rarely to appeal to a common law court for 
approval of the abatement of a public nuisance. Much nuisance pre-
vention was in effect accomplished ante hoc by zoning. Zoning came 
to be viewed as the wholesale equivalent of legislative authorization 
and functioned as a defense to nuisance actions based on strict liability 
just as legislative authorization had.132 The broad brush of zoning 
129 272 u.s. 365 (1926). For a discussion of the process leading to Euclid, see Martha A. Lees, 
Preserving Property Values? Preserving Proper Homes? Preserving Privilege?: the Pre-Euclid 
Debate over Zoning for E:x;clusively Private Residential Areas, 1916-1926, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 
367 (1994). 
130 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
131 In some respects the notion of reciprocity of advantage bears a resemblance to the classic 
common law nuisance rule that a private injury on a public nuisance must be one that is different 
in kind from that borne by all members of the public; an injury that is simply more intense in 
degree will not support a suit by a private party on a public nuisance. That rule was often used 
to defeat attacks on public improvements like railroads and bridges, whose building might 
severely impair the light or access of immediate neighbors, but also to a lesser extent that of 
passersby. See TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 74, at 76--77. 
132 See, e.g., Have v. Donner-Hanna Coke Co., 254 N.Y.S. 403, 414-15 (1931). 
116 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:89 
replaced the more particularized but suspect technique of using leg-
islative authorization to abate nuisances. In short, then, the reasons 
for maintaining a strict liability standard in nuisance-the conceptual 
protection of unitary property rights-had disappeared. 
B. Lawyers, Liability and Nuisance 
With the disappearance of the need for maintenance of a strict 
liability standard, "nuisance and other pockets of 'act at peril' liability 
were subjected to severe analytical pressure."133 The urgency of ap-
plying that pressure to eliminate strict liability causes of action in 
favor of "the liability-restricting tendencies of negligence"134 is illus-
trated by the way in which the plaintiffs' bar had taken advantage of 
the remnant of strict liability which nuisance afforded within the 
otherwise negligence-dominated ambit of tort law. 
To begin that illustration, I must return the reader's attention to 
the categories of nuisance action.135 Among them was the private 
action on a public nuisance, an action that could cover personal inju-
ries, if plaintiff claimed her particular injuries were caused by some-
thing that was also an interference with public rights. That action, 
because it was captioned "nuisance," allowed some personal injuries 
the benefit of a strict liability standard. Plaintiffs' lawyers were not 
long in recognizing that describing a client's tort claim as a nuisance 
could have a major impact on the outcome of the case.136 Not only 
would a nuisance caption provide the clear benefit of easier proofs, 
but it was also a way to avoid the hazard of contributory negligence 
as a defense to the plaintiff's action. Plaintiffs sought relief from the 
strictures of a negligence regime which not only refused relief for 
personal injuries due to defendants' careful, socially-useful activities, 
but also denied compensation even if defendant had been careless, if 
defendant could show that plaintiff had also failed to take due care. 
Thus, if their own contributory negligence might create a bar to 
recovery, plaintiffs brought personal injury suits as nuisance actions 
whenever they could. They argued that if defendant's negligence was 
not at issue in a nuisance action, governed as it was by strict liability, 
133 G. EDWARD WHITE, 'lbRT LAW IN AMERICA 129 (1980). 
134 Id. 
136 See text accompanying notes 37-58. 
136 For such advice to the litigator, see, e.g., Annotation, Contributory Negligence as Defense 
Against Liability for Damage From Nuisance, 57 A.L.R. 7 (1928) [hereinafter Annotation]. 
1998] THE NUISANCE KNOT 117 
then neither was plaintiff's.137 If one need not prove a defendant's 
failure to take due care, a plaintiff's failure to do so would not be 
relevant either. Thus, if a plaintiff could sustain a claim that her 
injuries were the consequence of a nuisance, her chances of recovery 
increased. 
These lawyering efforts provoked a judicial response which at last 
transformed the nuisance strict liability standard into an explicit tort 
negligence standard, at least insofar as personal injury was con-
cerned. Faced with precisely the attempt to gain the benefit of a strict 
liability standard for a personal injury case captioned as nuisance, 
Justice (then-Chief Judge) Cardozo said, "It would be intolerable if 
the choice of a name were to condition liability."138 He undertook to 
regularize the place of the personal injury action as a public nuisance 
and assimilate it to the law of torts. 
The facts of McFarlane v. City of Niagra Falls were fairly typical 
of a private action on a public nuisance: a plaintiff, walking at night, 
stumbled on a city sidewalk, tripping over an irregular outcropping 
of cement she had often seen during the day, sustaining injuries from 
her fall. 1a9 The case could easily have been brought as a standard 
personal injury case, but because the plaintiff had tripped on a defec-
tive public sidewalk, she could also claim damages for a particular 
injury due to interference with public rights, in other words, a public 
nuisance. The advantage of suing on a public nuisance was clear. After 
she sued the municipality, the defendant responded that McFarlane 
had been contributorily negligent because she had failed to take ap-
propriate care to avoid a hazard of which she was aware. Unlike the 
ordinary tort plaintiff, she could reply that the concept was inappo-
site: as nuisance rested upon strict liability, her contributory negli-
137 See id. The Annotation cites a number of nuisance cases in support of this proposition, 
including Philadelphia & Rail Road Company v. Smith, 64 F. 679, 680 (3d Cir. 1894), which stated: 
The doctrine of contributory negligence has no application [to this nuisance case]. One 
who decisively contributes to bring a mischief on himself may not impute it to another, 
but he who does hurt to his neighbor cannot escape liability for the damage thereby 
occasioned by showing that the person he has injured has also sustained other or 
additional damage of the same character through separate acts or omissions of his own. 
In such cases, each party is chargeable with the consequences of his own conduct, and 
neither of them is at liberty to shift his burden to the shoulders of the other. 
See id. The logic that one cannot harm another and claim immunity because of the other's fault 
did not apply in the ordinary personal injury action of the time. The necessity to treat all uses 
of property equally for fear of the destabilizing consequences of utilitarianism resulted in 
different approaches to injury to property and injury to person. 
138 McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 160 N.E. 391, 392 (N.Y. 1928). 
139 Id. at 391. 
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gence, if any, was not at issue. The trial court agreed with her and so 
instructed the jury.140 The issue of this instruction went to the New 
York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, where it became the 
subject of one of Cardozo's widely-cited opinions.141 
Cardozo acknowledged that the "primary meaning [of nuisance] 
does not involve the element of negligence as one of its essential 
factors."142 But, he continued, as to things not intrinsically dangerous 
or illegal, "what was lawful in its origin may be turned into a nuisance 
by negligence."143 In other words, where a use is not in itself unlawful 
or hazardous, negligence is the appropriate liability standard for the 
injuries attributable to that use. Cardozo cited to legislative authori-
zation cases for his examples of the use of a negligence standard in 
nuisance,144 but his point was not that legislative authorization could 
modify the nuisance standard of liability. Rather, Cardozo was judi-
cially modifying the common law as it applied to nuisance generally, 
concluding that where a use was lawful, the factfinder should judge 
not only the defendant's conduct, but the plaintiff's as well, by the 
rules of negligence. Thus, negligence was recognized as the appropri-
ate standard of liability for all personal injury actions, whether la-
beled tort or nuisance. Where the nuisance was a consequence of 
defendant's negligent conduct, plaintiff could "not avert the conse-
quences of his own contributory negligence by affixing to the negli-
gence of the wrongdoer the label of a nuisance."145 
The opinion contained a clue to Cardozo's larger aim, which went 
beyond simply linking plaintiff's negligence to defendant's. He did not 
rest with affirming that contributory negligence had a role as a de-
fense against liability for harm done by a lawful use negligently con-
ducted. Sua sponte, he went on to hint that the court might also 
recognize a defense of contributory negligence even where defen-
dant's use was still governed by strict liability. Where the nuisance 
was what Cardozo called "absolute," meaning it was intentional or 
140 See id. at 392. 
141 See, e.g., Hartman v. City of Brigantine, 129 A.2d 876, 879 (N.T. 1957); Hill v. Way, 168 A. 
1, 2 (Conn. 1933); Puffer v. C.E. Chappell & Sons, Inc., 123 N.Y.S.2d 468, 473 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1953). 
142 Id. at 391. This was rather a convoluted way of saying that common law nuisance was a 
strict liability cause of action. 
143 I d. at 392. 
144 See Trustees of Canandaigua v. Foster, 50 N.E. 971 (N.Y. 1898); Timlin v. Standard Oil Co., 
27 N.E. 786 (N.Y. 1891). 
145 McFarlane, 160 N.E. at 392. 
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itself illegal, the court was "not to be understood as holding by impli-
cation that . . . the negligence of the [plaintiff] is a fact of no ac-
count .... When a case of absolute nuisance shall be here, there will 
be need to determine whether contributory negligence in any sense 
is a factor to be weighed in determining liability."146 Negligence prin-
ciples, in other words, were not to be barred from any aspect of this 
tort, although it had hither to been considered governed by strict 
liability. The point then was to preserve and indeed enhance the 
primacy of negligence, with its "liability-restricting tendencies."147 
Henceforth, a suit for personal injury, even if due to some offending 
property use that also imperiled the public, would be strictly within 
the tort regime of negligence. Post-McFarlane, nuisance based on 
personal injury fell wholly within the ambit of negligence. Private 
nuisance, the cause of action for interference with rights in land, could 
be resolved by an award of damages.148 All that remained was the 
formal assimilation of the liability standard of the private nuisance 
action for injury to rights in land with the negligence standard that 
prevailed in the rest of the law of torts. This was the task of the 
Restatements. 
v. NUISANCE IN THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
Nuisance, originally assigned to the Restatement of Property and 
transferred from there to the Restatement of Torts,149 proved to be 
one of the most difficult and controversial sections of both Restate-
ments of Torts. Many considered its description in the Restatement 
(First) inadequate, while the subsequent revision in the Restatement 
(Second) was the source of great controversy and division. To the 
extent courts have relied upon these sections of the Restatements to 
determine when a nuisance exists, this too has been a source of 
confusion about nuisance doctrine. This article does not rehearse the 
1461d. at 393-94. Subsequently, the court held, in Delaney v. Philhearn Realty, 21 N.E.2d 507, 
509 (N.Y. 1939), that contributory negligence may be no defense in a case of per se nuisance. 
Other courts, however, found plaintiffs contributory negligence relevant there precisely be-
cause there was no negligence on the part of defendant and hence no wrong-doing. In such a 
case, plaintiffs wrong-doing takes on heightened importance. See, e.g., Curtis v. Kastner, 30 P.2d 
26, 28 (Cal. 1934). 
147 White, supra note 133, at 129. 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 118-28. 
149 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 821A (Tentative Draft No. 15, 1969) at 6 [hereinafter 
Draft 15]. 
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somewhat contested history of the Restatement project;l50 rather, it is 
concerned with the contribution of the Restatements of Torts to the 
view of Justice Blackmun and others151 that nuisance is entirely un-
principled. 
A. The Restatement (First) 
When the project of the Restatements began, the chapter on nui-
sance was assigned to the group preparing the Restatement of Prop-
erty.152 That group did not make much of nuisance and indeed omitted 
from their consideration public nuisance,153 including the personal in-
jury action on account of a public nuisance. The property group only 
considered private nuisance, that is, the noninvasive interference 
with the use and enjoyment ofland.154 "The result was that when the 
[nuisance] [c]hapter was transferred to the Restatement of Thrts, 
public nuisance was entirely omitted," in respect to interference with 
both public and private rights.155 Nor was the topic added after the 
shift.156 Thus, the work that was to cover the entirety of the common 
law of torts contained no discussion either of the public's right to be 
free of injurious property uses or of a plaintiff's suit for personal 
injury due to an act that was also an interference with public right, 
the aspect of nuisance most closely allied with tort.157 In fact, the tort 
lawyers and tort professors at work on the Restatement (First) of 
150 For a variety of views on the history and nature of the Restatements project, see N. E. 
H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law 
Institute,8 LAW & HIST. REV. 55, 84 (1990) (founding of American Law Institute (A.L.r.) and 
Restatement project "progressive"); WILLIAM TwINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST 
MOVEMENT 275-76 (1973) (Restatements "conservative"); G. Edward White, The American 
Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1,3 (1997) 
(Restatements were an "effort to resist as well as to embrace perceived changes in early 
twentieth-century American life."). At a minimum, Hull and Twining would probably agree with 
White that, at least in the minds of those who participated in creating them, the "Restatements 
were to clarify the meaning and shore up the stature of common law principles by stating them 
as precisely and categorically as possible." Id. at 23. 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 1-11. 
152 Draft 15, supra note 149, at 6. 
153 The charge to the drafters of the Restatement (Second) notes that ''tort liability for public 
nuisance ... is entirely ignored by the present Restatement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
ToRTS § 821A (Tentative Draft No. 15, 1969), QUESTIONS FOR TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 15 
SUGGESTED FOR DISCUSSION AT ANNUAL MEETING at xi. 
154 See id. § 821A, SCOPE AND INTRODUCTORY NOTE at 7. 
155 Id. § 821A, NOTE TO INSTITUTE at 6. 
156 "This Chapter ... does not deal with interests in which a person may be legally protected 
as a member of the public, such as interests in the use of public highways and public parks." 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF ToRTS ch. 40, SCOPE AND INTRODUCTORY NOTE at 215 (1939). 
157 See id. § 822, cmt. f, on clause (a). 
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Torts treated nuisance as though it were solely an issue of interfer-
ence with private property rights, that is, an invasion of interests in 
the private use of land.158 Courts and litigators dealing with cases of 
nuisance as personal injury were referred, insofar as they consulted 
the Restatement of Torts, to rules developed in cases about competing 
land use, though the two sets of cases were "not at all closely related," 
in the words of Dean Prosser, the original reporter for the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. 159 Obviously the potential for confusion and 
ill-considered decisions was immense. 
Inappropriate reference to the law of competing land use was not, 
however, the only source of confusion in the Restatement (First). Its 
explication of nuisance liability was itself a hodgepodge of all the 
available techniques for avoiding strict liability. The nuisance section 
began with the declaration that strict liability was no longer applica-
ble: "[t]here is no general rule of law that one acts at his peril in re-
spect to interferences with another's use or enjoyment of his land."I60 
The drafters noted that this was a break with the common law stand-
ard of nuisance liability, but stated, with no further explanation, that 
"[a] change has occurred."161 
According to the Restatement, not every interference with private 
rights in land was actionable; rather, relief was appropriate only when 
the interference was substantial: 
Life in organized society, and especially in populous communities, 
involves an unavoidable clash of individual interests .... It is an 
obvious truth that each individual in a community must put up 
with a certain amount of annoyance, inconvenience and interfer-
ence, and must take a certain amount of risk in order that all may 
get on together . . . . Liability is imposed only in those cases 
where the harm or risk to one is greater than he ought to be 
required to bear under the circumstances, at least without com-
pensation.162 
In this respect, the Restatement cautioned that nuisance was to be 
distinguished from trespass, though the reason for the distinction 
went unexplained.163 Trespass was liability-producing regardless of 
the degree of harm the invasion caused, while nuisance required 
158 Invasions of Interests in the Private Use of Land was indeed the title of the first Restate-
ment's chapter on nuisance. 
159 Draft 15, supra note 149, § 821A SCOPE AND INTRODUCTORY NOTE at 10. 
160 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 'IbRTS § 822 cmt. m (1939). 
161 Draft 15, supra note 149, § 822 cmt. b (1969). 
162 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 'IbRTS § 822 cmt. j. 
163 See Draft 15, supra note 149, § 821D at 47. 
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substantial harm as a liability threshold.164 Moreover, sUbstantiality 
was to be measured by the standards of "normal persons in the 
community and not [by] the standards of the individuals who happen 
to be using or occupying ... [the] land at a particular time."165 This 
also differed from the ordinary common law tort approach that defen-
dant must take the plaintiff as she found him.166 In nuisance, according 
to the Restatement, the defendant was allowed to claim that, because 
plaintiff's situation was particularistic, peculiar and singular, he was 
not entitled to relief. In effect, this amounted to the adoption of the 
English inquiry into community standards,167 
A use was a nuisance if unreasonable, however. In the case of 
an unintentional nuisance, the Restatement (First) required proof of 
negligence, recklessness or conduct of ultrahazardous activities, all 
forms of unreasonable behavior.16s With regard to an intentional inva-
sion, the reasonableness inquiry measured whether the gravity of 
harm to plaintiff's interest outweighed the utility of defendant's use.169 
If the scales were out of balance in this respect, defendant was at fault 
and the harm due to the use compensable. Otherwise, the Restate-
ment (First) expected plaintiffs to bear uncompensated harms that 
might, for them, be quite severe, if the utility of the defendant's 
conduct to society at large was great enough. 
164 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 'lbRTS ch. 40 SCOPE AND INTRODUCTORY NOTE at 225. 
165 Id. § 822 cmt. g. 
166 "[AJ defendant who is negligent must take existing circumstances as he finds them, and 
may be liable for consequences brought about by his acts, even though they were not reasonably 
anticipated." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 'lbRTS 299-300 (3d ed. 1964). 
167 See supra text accompanying notes 93-97. 
168 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 'lbRTS § 822(d)(ii) (1934). What the Restatement called "ultra-
hazardous" activity was governed by a form of strict liability, derived from the English case of 
Rylands v. Fletcher. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). In Rylands, the court found the defendant liable 
for the injuries consequent on activities, which, even when conducted with great care, involved 
extreme risk. [d. Rylands had a checkered career in the United States, with some arguing that 
it was simply a subset of nuisance doctrine's strict liability for injury to a neighbor's use and 
enjoyment ofland. See, e.g., William Prosser, The Principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, in SELECTED 
'lbPICS ON THE LAW OF 'lbRTS 135, 185 (1953). Others claimed it was a unique kind of liability 
based upon the particularly dangerous character of certain activities. See, e.g., Seavey, supra 
note 4, at 985-86. 
Likening Rylands to nuisance liability allowed Prosser to conclude that an "unreasonable-
ness" component was included within all nuisance liability, whether based on negligence or on 
''ultrahazardous'' Rylands-type activities. In the latter case, the severity of the threat conse-
quent on the activity itself made its injurious consequences ipso facto unreasonable and there-
fore liability was fault-based. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 'lbRTS 336, 
393 (2d ed. 1955). 
169 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 'lbRTS § 826 (1934). If the consequences of defendant's 
activities were not foreseeable, then reasonableness meant defendant had used due care, given 
the nature of the activity; that amounted to a negligence standard. See id. § 822(d)(ii). 
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So, in addition to the English policy of consulting the standards of 
the neighborhood rather than the condition of the individual plaintiff 
in order to decide whether a use was a nuisance, the Restatement 
(First) adopted as well the parallel American approach of balancing 
of equities, in the statement that "[r ]egard must be had not only for 
the interests of the person harmed but also for the interests of the 
actor and for the interests of the community as a whole."170 The 
process measured relative values,171 and was a comparative evaluation 
of conflicting interests.172 That evaluation was explicitly based upon 
"[h]ow much social value a particular type of use has in comparison 
with other types of use."173 Obviously, such a test favored large-scale 
uses arguably benefiting large numbers of people over small-scale 
uses. 
When the Restatement (First) spoke of "the utility" of defendant's 
conduct, its drafters made clear that they meant its social value-that 
is, whether "the general public good is in some way advanced or 
protected by the encouragement and achievement of [the defendant's] 
purposes."174 If a defendant so advancing the public good could not 
correct the situation offensive to plaintiff without incurring "expense 
or hardship of such magnitude that it would be considerably less 
profitable to continue ... the invasion [was] not practically avoidable," 
and would be allowed to continue despite its consequences to plain-
tiff.175 In effect, the existence of fault leading to liability was a social 
decision. Thus, the Restatement (First) articulated a two-part inquiry 
to determine liability for invasion of private rights in land: first, the 
harm was compared to the community standard to assess the substan-
tiality of the interference; and second, a determination as to the 
reasonableness of the interference was made. Such reasonableness 
was based upon a balance of the equities between the harm to plaintiff 
and the social value of the defendant's conduct. 
170 [d. § 826 cmt. b. 
171 See id. at § 826 cmt. a. 
172 See id. § 826 at cmt. b. 
173 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF ToRTS § 827 cmt. e (1934). 
174 [d. § 828 cmt. d. 
175 [d. § 828 cmt. g. 
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B. The Restatement (Second) 
When the Restatement (Second) was in contemplation, the reliance 
on community standards embodied in the Restatement (First) was a 
primary target. l76 However, Dean Prosser, the first reporter for the 
American Law Institute's project to revise the Restatement of Torts, 
did not propose to change the view of fault as a combination of viola-
tion of community standards and lack of social utility. Professor 
Fleming James, with the support of other members of the torts advi-
sory group,177 wrote a long, heavily-cited memorandum challenging 
Prosser on the liability issue.l78 James argued that fault had not been 
part of the nuisance inquiry in the common law, which imposed strict 
liability where a nuisance existed. l79 He noted that the Restatement 
(First) had required fault, either in the form of negligence, intent or 
participation in abnormally dangerous activities. lso But when intent 
was the basis of liability, common where defendant was likely to 
know in advance the probable effects of its enterprise on the sur-
rounding neighborhood, the Restatement (First) said defendant's con-
duct would not be considered faulty unless unreasonable, and would 
not be considered unreasonable where socially useful. Said James: 
This line of reasoning is, of course, quite in keeping with the late 
nineteenth and earlier twentieth century urge to reduce all tort 
liability to terms of fault .... But this reasoning unduly simplifies 
the matter by leaving out of account a basis of liability without 
fault the recognition of which gives greater flexibility to the law 
of nuisance and better explains some lines of cases than the Re-
statement's procrustean insistence on fault. l8l 
The "lines of cases" to which James referred were those withhold-
ing injunctive relief, but allowing a damages remedy.l82 James argued 
that instead of forcing the liability standard to change in order to 
encompass decisions about social utility, the Restatement (Second) 
should explicitly approve the damages remedy courts had already 
176 See 47 A.L.I. PROC. 309-26 (1970) (debating a change in the view of fault). 
177 See Robert E. Keeton, Restating Strict Liability and Nuisance, 48 VAND. L. REV. 595, 600 
(1995). 
178 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 'lbRTS § 840F app. A at 132 (Tentative Draft No. 16, 1970) 
[hereinafter Draft 16). 
179 See id. 
180 See id. 
181 [d. at 134 (citations omitted). 
182 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 118-28. 
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fashioned. "[W]here the actor is also the beneficiary of the conduct, 
the law may render his privilege incomplete; it may make him pay for 
the actual harm caused by its exercise. This, it is submitted, is the 
proper explanation ofliability in some cases of nuisance."l83 A faultless 
defendant whose worthwhile use injured another should be held liable 
for damages, but not enjoined. In that case, "[the] defendant's ... 
'fault' lies in failure to pay for what he does rather than in doing the 
thing itself," wrote James.l84 He went on to adduce many cases which 
had ordered and approved of a damages-no injunction remedy after a 
finding ofnuisance.l85 That remedy, according to James, required nei-
ther the Restatement (First),s reversal of the traditional strict liabil-
ity standard in nuisance, nor the unpalatable alternative of halting a 
profitable use which benefitted the community. 
J ames' position was also that of Page Keeton and Clarence Morris, 
who had earlier argued in an influential articlel86 against the balancing 
of equities to deny relief in nuisance cases. Instead, they suggested 
that when a useful enterprise harmed a particular plaintiff, the plain-
tiff should be allowed damages but no injunction.187 The KeetonIMor-
ris take on the problem was an interesting one. Although injunctions 
might look like "poor man's justice"l88 (and they were often so de-
scribed by courtS),189 they were really a form of extortion and could 
drive socially-useful industries out of business. Keeton and Morris 
suggested letting a factfinder decide what the plaintiff's injury was 
worth, even if defendant had acted intentionally. A factfinder would 
assess the extent of defendant's liability, rather than leaving it to a 
plaintiff armed with an injunction and motivated to exact the highest 
possible price for it. 
In discussions of the revision of the nuisance section for the new 
Restatement, Keeton suggested that it include the explicit statement: 
183 Draft 16, supra note 178, § 840F app. A, at 134. 
184 I d. at 135. 
185 Id. at 135-38. 
1116 W. Page Keeton & Clarence Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18 TEx. L. REV. 
412, 423--25 (1940). 
187 The drafters of the Restatement (First), while disclaiming any intention to discuss the 
standards for granting injunctions, nonetheless said that, on occasion, damages should be 
granted to provide compensation for the harm done by a use too important to enjoin. That point 
was not embodied in black letter, but was part of the Scope and Introductory Note to Chapter 
40. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF ToRTS ch. 40 (1939). 
188 Keeton & Morris, supra note 186, at 423--25. 
189 See id. at 423--25 n.29. 
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[e]ven though one's conduct is reasonable in the sense that its 
social utility outweighs the harms and risks it causes, he is subject 
to liability[l90] for a private nuisance if the resulting interference 
with another's use and enjoyment of land is greater than it is 
reasonable to require the other to bear under the circumstances 
without compensation.191 
Over Prosser's "vigorous dissent," a majority of the American Law 
Institute (the "Institute") voted at its May 1970 meeting to adopt 
what were called the "James-Keeton Proposals."l92 That summer 
Prosser resigned for reasons of health,t93 to be replaced by John Wade, 
who undertook to revise the nuisance chapter in the direction sug-
gested by James and accepted by the Institute.l94 
Although the Institute voted to adopt them,t95 the James-Keeton 
Proposals did not make it into the final version of the Restatement 
(Second). Instead, an addition was made to § 826, "Unreasonableness 
of Invasion," which provided that a use that did substantial harm was 
unreasonable if the offending use could compensate its neighbors for 
substantial harm without going out of business.196 With time running 
short, Wade also convinced the Institute in a close vote that the 
utility-harm balance Keeton suggested could better be explained as a 
comment demonstrating a specific application of a general principle, 
rather than in the black letter itself.197 
In the end, then, the Restatement (Second) did not substantially 
modify the Restatement (First),s account of the liability decision in 
private nuisance cases claiming injury due to an ongoing industrial 
use. Nor did the Restatement (Second) succeed in easing the difficul-
190 The version actually voted on by the Institute included here the words "for damages, but 
not for an injunction." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS (Tentative Draft No. 17, 1971), 
James-Keeton Proposals [hereinafter James-Keeton Proposals]. 
191 47 A.L.I. PROC. 312, 323-35 (1970). 
192 Robert Keeton, supra note 177, at 600 n.9; see also 47 A.L.I. PROC. 309-25 (1970). 
193 See Robert Keeton, supra note 177, at 607. 
194 See id. at 600. 
195 See id. 
196 John W. Wade, Environmental Protection, The Common Law of Nuisance and the Restate-
ment of 1brts, 8 FORUM 165, 171 (1972). Wade's fonnulation, now part of the Restatement 
(Second), seems to lead to the corollary that a use that cannot afford to compensate its neighbors 
for substantial hann should be allowed to continue free of the burden of paying damages and 
without exposure to injunction. That view is currently considered unacceptable, at least to the 
extent that internalizing externalities is taken to be an aim of common law actions regarding 
competing uses. See, e.g., David R. Rodas, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Law 
Citizen Suits for Relieffrom Environmental Harm, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883, 889 (1989); Bryson 
& MacBeth, supra note 10, at 274. 
197 Wade, supra note 196, at 171; see also James-Keeton Proposals, supra note 190, at 31. 
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ties of determining whether a remedy was available when there was 
injury on one side and utility on the other. Instead, it retained the 
Restatement (First),s two-step inquiry into substantiality and reason-
ableness. An intentional nuisance is actionable when two circum-
stances exist: (1) the harm caused is substantial, and (2) the gravity 
of the harm outweighs the utility of the defendant's enterprise and 
makes its continuance unreasonable. l98 The utility of the defendant's 
conduct includes both its utility to the community and its utility to 
defendant, thereby retaining the Restatement (First),s implicit deci-
sion that a large investment should be more firmly protected against 
internalizing its costs than a small one. 
As to the question of compensation, the Restatement (Second)'s 
position was apparently designed to keep a damages action from 
turning into a de facto injunction by threatening the continued exist-
ence of defendant's operation.199 Nonetheless, it had the effect of re-
quiring plaintiffs and the community to bear the externalized costs of 
an operation when defendant could not afford to internalize. In ex-
change, one imagines, the community is able to retain the jobs which 
would otherwise be lost by the closing of the offending use. 
In the last analysis, said the Restatement (Second), throwing in the 
towel on the attempt to give a tight account of nuisance liability, "the 
unreasonableness of intentional invasions is a problem of relative 
value to be determined by the trier of fact in each case in the light of 
all the circumstances of that case."200 A contemporaneous commentary 
concludes that, in regard to nuisance, it is "virtually impossible to 
state with surety what principles the Restatement (Second) embod-
ies."201 The law professor who has tried to use the Restatement (Sec-
ond) to teach nuisance to her torts or property class, and the practi-
tioner who pulls it off the shelf for an introduction to the doctrine, 
would both agree. 
There is a curious epilogue to the story of the Restatements. The 
unhappiness of some torts scholars and members of the Institute with 
the nuisance sections of the Restatement (Second) did not end with 
its pUblication or indeed with Dean Prosser's death. Subsequently, 
Page Keeton, a leading critic of Prosser's position on nuisance, edited 
198 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 826 (1979). 
199 See Keeton & MOlTis, supra note 186, at 423-24. 
200 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 826, cmt. b. Compare, e.g., Booth v. Rome, w. & 
O.T.R. Co., 35 N.E. 592 (N.Y. 1893). 
201 Bryson & MacBeth, supra note 10, at 272 n.I4B. 
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the first posthumous revision of Prosser's classic handbook with 
Robert Keeton, Daniel Dobbs and David Owen. Although most of the 
substance of the earlier edition was left untouched, the sections on 
nuisance were completely revised to comport with Page Keeton's 
views. According to the new editors, this was done because the earlier 
nuisance sections had "produced much confusion and some erroneous 
results."202 A reviewer comparing the fifth edition of the handbook to 
its predecessors says, "The chapters on nuisance and strict liability 
provide . . . dramatic instances of revisions based principally on dif-
ferences of opinion between Prosser and [his] revisers."203 
In fact, the nuisance sections of the fifth edition of Prosser and 
Keeton on Thrts are in substantial and direct disagreement with the 
Restatement (Second) of Thrts. Two courts, each trying to decide 
whether liability for common law nuisance exists on the same set of 
facts, one relying on the authoritative handbook, Prosser and Keeton 
on Thrts, and the other on the no less authoritative Restatement 
(Second), could easily reach opposite opinions as to the commands of 
the common law. They would in such cases be better advised to turn 
directly to the common law of the relevant state. 
CONCLUSION AND A CAVEAT 
Nuisance both served and obstructed a variety of public and private 
needs at least in the period prior to the bureaucratization of land use. 
That very process of bureaucratization, culminating in the congeries 
of state and federal statutes and regulations that today govern land 
use, was in some measure a reaction to the inability of nuisance law 
to provide fully for a resolution of the landuse conflicts which arose 
in a developed economy. Its landuse dispute resolution function lost 
to regulation, nuisance then came mostly within the tort ambit, where 
its strict liability birth and subsequent history made it a cuckoo in the 
nest. 
Attempts to rationalize the doctrine were, as we have seen, unavail-
ing, because of the inherent conflict between the systemic necessity 
for strict liability as a protector of rights in property, and the utilitar-
ian and intellectual concern about the inflexibility of the liability rule. 
Nuisance then fell into disuse. Consequently, Lucas' attempt to revive 
202 W. PAGE KEETON ETAL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS 652 (5th ed.1984). 
203 Craig Joyce, Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th Ed., 39 
VAND. L. REV. 851, 873 (1986) (book review). 
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it must contend with this difficult history. In actuality, it is the courts 
that must apply Lucas that will have to contend with this sordid 
legacy. 
In trying to untangle some of the strands that have contributed to 
the nuisance knot, this article cannot claim completion. In particular, 
what is omitted from this discussion is the difference between nui-
sance actions brought by private plaintiffs and those litigated by 
public plaintiffs. This is a topic so significant as to warrant a separate 
piece, particularly in light of Lucas.204 That case, though it calls for 
the application of nuisance law to the takings problem, virtually ig-
nores public nuisance, the branch of nuisance doctrine most relevant 
to the inquiry about the common law's understanding of the relation-
ship of private property and public right. Rather than deal with that 
defect in Lucas, this article has attempted to explain the sources of 
confusion about nuisance doctrine, and to unpack some elements of 
that confusion. 
The three factors identified as contributing to the current percep-
tion of nuisance as unprincipled-economic development, lawyering, 
and attempts at rationalization-are not of course unique to this 
doctrine. Indeed, one might say that they are always at work when 
the common law changes. Nuisance made its appearance in America 
in a form already somewhat less than clear because of its historical 
origins as a doctrine simultaneously partaking of elements of the 
criminal law, the law of real property, and the law of personal injury. 
Then, because the underlying doctrine itself was called upon to play 
such an important role in resolving landuse conflicts during the tran-
sition from an agrarian to an industrial economy, the strains placed 
on it were perhaps more intense than those that economic develop-
ment generally placed on the common law. Later, because of the 
odd formations left behind by these English and American historical 
forces, the doctrine was subjected to judicial responses to lawyering 
efforts on behalf of clients for whom nuisance law could help achieve 
successful litigation outcomes. Finally, the attempt to find an explicit 
consensus among lawyers and law professors about the shape and 
attributes of the doctrine created yet more confusion about its mean-
ing and its content. 
Thus, three strands-economic development, lawyering and con-
scious attempts at reconstruction-have all contributed their particu-
204 505 u.s. 1003. 
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lar piece to confusion over nuisance law. From the attempt to maintain 
the sanctity of rights in property against social encroachment came a 
de facto, but not de jure, damage remedy for injuries to rights in land 
otherwise abatable by injunction. The attempts of private plaintiffs' 
lawyers to find a place for strict liability in the law of torts gave rise 
to a judicial reaction declaring nuisance in cases of private injury to 
be wholly within the ambit of the tort standard of negligence, but 
without examination of the consequences of that declaration for the 
invasion of property rights. Lastly, the drafters of the Restatements 
produced an intellectually unsatisfactory consensus attempt to re-
solve both problems. 
What this article has set forth is, all in all, not a pretty sight-the 
doctrine of nuisance, too contested to rationalize, too useful to aban-
don, is a mess, a muddle, a knot. It is, however, our current guide to 
the law of takings. This article at least provides court and litigator 
with a way to read the mass of nuisance cases that a search will turn 
up, a mass of cases that appears internally contradictory and, as 
Justice Blackmun says, devoid of "anything resembling a principle." 
Principles there are, but they are principles that have been both 
maintained and subverted. 
